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Abstract– Even though the TA has not been institutionalized in 
Japan, there have been many TA and TA- like activities, in areas 
including food, healthcare, energy and technology strategy, since 
the idea of TA was introduce from the US. This paper analyzes 
the nature and limits of those TA and TA like activities; and the 
lessons for institutionalization of TA in the context of Japan are 
discussed, including the need for flexible framing and 
collaboration, the importance of appropriate distance, and the 
role of the Diet.. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION! 
Even though the TA (technology assessment) has not been 
institutionalized in Japan, there have been many TA and TA- 
like activities since the end of 1960’s when the idea of TA was 
introduce from the US. TA is practice which supports 
problem-definition or decision making for the development 
and utilization of technologies by anticipating the various 
social impacts of technologies and technology related 
measures. When the scope of the range of social impacts 
considered is limited to specific aspects or the practice is not 
labeled as TA, those practices are called TA-like activities. 
Those TA and TA-like activities were interesting; but because 
of the lack of institutionalization, those attempts were not 
necessarily effective. Institutionalization of TA means the 
formal establishment and legitimization of TA activities in the 
institutional structure of government and society. In this paper, 
we analyze the contents of those TA and TA like activities and 
explore the limits and the lessons of those activities. This 
analysis will be useful when the institutionalization of TA is 
attempted in the context of Japan.  
  In November 1969, a mission from the Japan 
Techno-Economics Society (JATES) visited the US and 
brought back a novel term TA. After the mission came back, 
the Eight-Members Committee was organized in 1970; and 
they placed TA on the agenda, explaining that the 
reconsideration of the development of science and technology 
was a top priority to solve urgent problems such as global 
environmental issues. As pollution and energy-saving were 
the most urgent issues to be solved at that time, they defined 
TA as “conducting check and regulation repetitively in the 
development and application of technology” [1].   
  After that, various attempts were undertaken by 
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government organizations and non-governmental actors. 
Those are analyzed in the following chapters. Chapter 2 
focuses on TA activities, chapter 3 focuses on TA like 
activities, and chapter 4 will discuss the limits of those TA 
and TA like activities and the lessons for institutionalization 
of TA in the context of Japan.  
II. ATTEMPTS OF TA IN JAPAN  
A. STA – Attempts for Methodological Development  
The Planning Bureau of the Science and Technology 
Agency (STA) began to research on TA in 1970 and 
mentioned about TA in 1970 White Paper published in April 
1971. Science and Technology Council (Recommendation No. 
5) also emphasized the importance of TA as an instrument of 
science and technology for human welfare [2]. The 1973 
Science and Technology White Paper stated, “TA…seeks to 
examine and evaluate technology from many aspects 
beforehand, including its benefits and undesirable impacts, 
the technological as well as economic potential, and the 
society’s viewpoint.” This text clearly indicates wider social 
impacts TA will focus [3].  
In addition to abstract discussion, the Planning Bureau 
established in April 1971 an expert committee and started 
case studies of TA to develop methodologies of TA. Concrete 
areas chosen were pesticide, high-rise building and computer 
aided intelligence. The case study on agricultural chemicals 
was one of three studies launched [4] [5]. An interesting 
aspect of this case is the breadth of the analysis, which 
encompasses the impacts of the technology on society, culture, 
and even minds and lifestyles of people. For example, it gives 
labor-saving effects of agricultural chemicals as a negative 
impact of agricultural chemicals on farmers. It argues that this 
would lead to the exodus of young workers leaving the area, 
thus breaking up families and creating problems for the 
regional community. On the other hand, as for the positive 
impact for the society, it lists the reduction of infectious 
diseases and the creation of surplus labor. In the category of 
culture, the negative impact on farmers includes a decline in 
the traditional farm village arts and the decline of the farm 
village environment.  
  As an analysis this TA on pesticide has broader focus on 
various social aspects and interesting. But this was the case 
study for the development of the methodology and 
experimental feedback to the decision making or the agenda 
setting on agriculture was not observed.  
  The STA also experimented TA methods in the policy 
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areas under the STA jurisdiction in 1973. But the Planning 
Bureau was fearful of the resistance from bureaus in charge of 
specific area such as nuclear policy and space policy. So the 
five bureaus in the STA independently conducted TA in 1973. 
TA became as a tool to perform accountability for the 
individual bureaus’ own projects from narrow focus. One in 
the Planning Bureau admits that there was no serious mood in 
the bureau because of the missing link between TA exercises 
and policymaking [1].  
As those in the bureau realized the limitation of such 
sectional TA activities, an official once lobbied for the 
establishment of a parliamentary TA organization like the US 
Office of Technology Assessment (OTA). The official lobbied 
some Diet members during 1977-78, but these members had 
never in mind that the Diet undertakes TA activities. 
Following the members’ little interest, the Research Bureau in 
the Diet became intimidated. The failure of lobbying resulted 
in the abandonment of the institutionalization of TA and the 
withdrawal of the TA case studies in the STA [6].  
 
B. MITI – Experimental Uses of TA in R&D 
MITI launched an in-house TA study group in May 1971 
and also started with a TA case study of nuclear steelmaking. 
At the same time, a MITI’s Advisory Committee for Industrial 
Structure reported that “it is necessary to place TA in the total 
system in the industrial policy”. In March 1973, MITI 
informed that they would conduct TA on their concerned 
R&D projects as many as possible. MITI had a will to use TA 
in the administration of R&D projects.  
  One of the interesting attempts is the TA related to the 
Sunshine Project. The MITI contracted institutions for TA on 
solar energy technologies, geothermal energy development 
and utilization technologies, technologies for the gasification 
and the liquefaction of coal, and hydrogen energy 
technologies, and conducted studies for three years beginning 
in fiscal year 1974, the year the Sunshine Project was initiated. 
TAs of solar energy technologies were conducted by the Japan 
Research Institute [7]. Through TA activities, the members 
pointed out that, if the objective of promoting the use of solar 
energy was to respond to the depletion of resources and 
environmental protection, the energy efficiency should be in 
the scope of the project. This included the “insulation of 
buildings”, reduction of electricity use, and the containment 
of transport losses for solar power generation plants. They 
also claimed that the Sunshine Project only considered seed 
sides such as air conditioning, etc., using solar energy, and 
raised the issue that there were no themes such as the R&D of 
houses that do not need air conditioning devices [8].  
  In this case, through the practice of TA, important 
elements for the implementation of the project, that is, link 
with energy efficiency measures, needs of the users rather 
than the seeds of technologies were identified. But as no 
feedback mechanism was established at that time, the TA 
report which was interesting as an analysis was not used 
effectively.  
 
C. MAFF and Hokkaido Government – Consensus 
Conferences on GM  
Around 2000 in Japan, public concern over food safety 
arose as a variety issues associated with food emerged. The 
handling of BSE, in particular, incurred public distrust of 
governments. At that time, participatory TA, such as the 
consensus conference developed by Denmark, drew interest 
as a tool for improving communication. Using Danish 
practice as a model, consensus conferences were held for GM 
foods at national and local levels in Japan.  
  At the national level, the Society for Techno-innovation 
in Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries (STAFF) under the 
MAFF (Ministry of Agriculture, Forest and Fishery) held the 
first consensus conference on GM crops by a public 
organization in 2000. This was conducted by STAFF under 
the project of “Research Responding to the Citizen’s 
Proposal.” The purpose was to obtain people’s concerns and 
suggestions through the consensus conference and promote 
the necessary research. 
The final report, produced by the consensus conference, 
addressed the following nine issues: (1) GM technology; (2) 
the benefits of GM technology to society (amount of 
agricultural chemicals used, food crisis measures); (3) 
environmental effects of GM crops (hybridization, effects on 
the ecosystem); (4) impact of GM foods on health; (5) 
systems and mechanisms for GM crops; (6) labeling; (7) 
Japan’s agro-industry (the role of GM in Japan’s agro-industry, 
self-sufficiency rate); (8) international relations (world food 
supply, economic gap between developed and developing 
nations); (9) information provided by the government. The 
STAFF presented the result to the MAFF and the Ministry of 
Health, Labor and Welfare (MHLW). Following the inputs, 
the monitoring research program of GM crops was introduced 
in 2001.   
  One of the interesting aspects of this attempt is that the 
consensus conference was conducted under the project of 
“Research Responding to the Citizen’s Proposal”. And based 
on the outputs of it, concrete research program on monitoring 
was undertaken. In that sense, it can be said that this attempt 
of the consensus conference was partially institutionalized. 
But compared to the wideness of perspectives presented in the 
final report including benefits, environmental impacts, health 
impacts, industrial structure and international relations, the 
scope of social impacts which can be dealt with under the 
institutional framework was very limited.  
  Another interesting case of participatory TA on GM is 
the Consensus Conference by the Hokkaido Government 
Office. With the proposed review of the ordinance regarding 
GM in Hokkaido (an ordinance preventing cross-cultivation 
involving the growing of GM crops in open environment), the 
purpose of the consensus conference was to gain an 
understanding of the general public opinion and reflect the 
discussion on the topic in the review process. 
The following issues were voiced in the final report: (1) 
From a safety assurance viewpoint: (a) the safety of the crops 
as food; (b) labeling; (c) the effects on environment; (d) 
bioethical issues, uncertainty and sustainability of the practice, 
technological development; (e) future disclosure of 
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information on GM crops; (f) safety testing to be carried out 
by an independent organization; (2). From a consumer and 
producer viewpoint: (a) the advantages and disadvantages for 
consumers; (b) the advantages and disadvantages for 
producers (such labor reduction and competitiveness toward 
imports); (c) GM crops from an economic perspective; (3) 
The meaning of cultivation of GM crops for agriculture in 
Hokkaido. With Regard to the use of the final report, 
“although it is not strongly linked, this consensus conference 
is the first conference whose out put was formally connected 
with the decision making of local governing bodies in Japan” 
[9].  
  One of the important issues emerged from these cases is 
the issue of “appropriate distance”, that is, the issue of to what 
degree the conclusions of the consensus conference should be 
linked to policy making. In the case of the STAFF consensus 
conference, the MAFF, who was taking a risk by funding a 
study with no clear outcome known in advance, wanted to 
avoid incidences of policies being restricted by the results of 
the conference [10]. It has been pointed out that “As it was a 
part of an openly recruited program on GM by the MAFF, and 
it was planned that the conclusion from the citizen panel 
would also be used as a research topic within this program, it 
was confined to this project, but this made it simple to 
organize” [11]. To carry out consensus conference as part of 
the project for research was probably the reason it was 
possible to carry it out. In this context, the Hokkaido 
consensus conference, which had an explicit link to policy, is 
different. The Hokkaido consensus conference had the 
possibility of having an influence in the policy making 
process. On the other hand, there can be a possibility that 
range of social impacts would be narrowed down because of 
the direct link to policy making. 
III. EXPERIENCES OF TA-LIKE ACTIVITIES  
A. Science and Technology Policy Analysis by NGO  
In October 1966, executives in companies such as Toshiba 
and NEC established the Japan Techno-Economics Society 
(JATES). The aim is to improve communications between 
experts in science, technology and economy from industry, 
university and government, and to examine issues on science, 
technology and economy. JATES soon launched forecasting 
and planning research groups: FROG (Future Research 
Operational Group) in 1968. Through these exercises it was 
recognized in JATES about the need to establish a permanent 
research organization. 
  As mentioned in chapter 1, in October 1969, JATES sent 
a mission to the US After coming back to Japan, the research 
group proposed to set up think-tanks for forecasting and 
planning research. JATES first planned to establish a 
think-tank therein, but Noboru Shinohara, administrative vice 
minister in the STA, took an initiative to establish a research 
organization independent from JATES. Shigeru Yonezawa, 
Governor of Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Public 
Corporation (NTTPC; now NTT) promised to offer financial 
and human resources.  
  Finally IFTECH (The Institute for Future Technology) 
was established as an incorporated foundation in February 
1971, based on the activities of FROG of JATES. The basic 
fund was contributed by Toshiba, Hitachi and NEC. The 
initial target for the contribution was 300 million yen, but the 
1973 oil shock made it difficult to achieve the target. As a 
consequence, IFTECH had to undertake sponsored research 
from the outset and it has never been a non-profit and 
independent organization in a strict sense [12]. 
IFTEC was not an organization devoted to TA activities, 
rather and organization working on technology foresight. But 
the activities of IFTEC also incorporated social dimensions of 
technologies. One of the initial fundamental research themes 
was the basic design of Japanese-style science and technology 
development system. IFTEC also involved in the Delphi 
studies which have been undertaken almost every 5 years by 
STA, especially in the fourth and fifth rounds. The STA 
commissioned IFTECH to carry out the study. IFTECH had 
leeway to internally hold frank discussion.  
 
B. Risk Management on Food s 
The risk-analysis in food safety policy consists of three 
elements: risk assessment, risk management, and risk 
communication. The Food Safety Commission (FSC) has 
been designated as the organization responsible for risk 
assessment, while MHLW and MAFF have been designated 
as the organizations responsible for risk management. At 
every stage of the process, risk communication is the 
obligation of the organizations responsible for both risk 
management and risk assessment. 
  Accordingly, as regards the scientific safety assessment 
of food, assessments of the health effects are routinely carried 
out by experts on the FSC’s expert panels. Risk management 
measures are carried out on the basis of an overall judgment 
encompassing various elements such as economic 
considerations (cost-effectiveness), social considerations, and 
political considerations. Under the framework of risk analysis, 
factors other than scientific safety impacts that should be 
taken into consideration in terms of risk management are 
termed “Other Legitimate Factors (OLF)”. Specifically, 
economic, social, ethical, and cultural factors can be 
considered to fall within the remits of OLF. However, there is 
no explicit debate on evaluating these factors. 
In this area, the practice of risk communication is also 
emphasized. The framework stipulates the importance of 
interaction between the stakeholders and a multiplicity of 
views. However, it features a greater emphasis on information 
disclosure and persuasion than on mutual interaction. In a 
2006 report entitled “Towards Better Risk Communication on 
Food Safety,” the FSC referred to participatory TA (involving 
consensus conferences, focus groups) as one of the means for 
resolving this problem; however, this has yet to be realized. 
 
C. Assessment in the Medical Costs Reimbursement System  
MMW (Ministry of Health and Welfare) used the phrase 
“medical technology assessment (MTA)” in its 1990 White 
Paper, saying “future challenges for research into science and 
technology in the health sector include the establishment of 
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medical technology assessment that scientifically assesses the 
best approach to clinical applications of rapidly developing 
medical technology.” The white paper goes on to explain the 
term “MTA” as follows: “a comprehensive assessment of 
medical technology and devices that includes not only their 
effectiveness and safety but also aspects such as economic 
efficiency, ethics, etc” [13]. But, partly because of the 
opposition from Japan Medical Association, HTA was never 
institutionalized.  
On the other hand, there are three levels of TA like activities 
relating to health care services. First level is an examination 
of the impact on the human body, including a drug toxicity 
assessment which is built into the system as the precondition 
for the introduction of the technology. Second level is an 
economic and other assessment of the medical technology, 
which is concluded in the framework of the medical costs 
reimbursement system. Third level is bioethical 
considerations, which are deliberated at the Council for 
Science and Technology Policy and the Diet.  
Among them, assessment in medical costs reimbursement 
system is undertaken by the Central Social Insurance Medical 
Council (CSIMC), which is an advisory body to the MHLW. 
The Health Technology Assessment Subcommittee comprised 
of experts under the CSIMC specializes in it. The written 
health technology assessment proposals are required to 
include the following assessment items: (1) effectiveness, (2) 
safety, (3) ease of dissemination, (4) the maturity of the 
technology, (5) morality and social validity, (6) forecast 
impact on medical expenses, (7) the category of medical costs 
reimbursement which is thought to be reasonable, and (8) 
comparison with alternative technologies already covered by 
insurance. However, it has been pointed out that there are 
unclear points about the criteria for insurance coverage of 
drugs. 
 
D. Assessment of Nuclear Energy  
The Agency for Natural Resources and Energy of the 
Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) is in charge 
of energy policy. Because of the multi dimensions of the 
social implications of energy such as energy security, 
environment and economy, it has to undertake TA like 
activities incorporating social dimensions, using arena of 
Advisory Council for Natural Resources and Energy. Among 
the various energy sources, nuclear energy has wider social 
implications including safety and security, and it has to be 
treated with special care.  
The Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) also undertakes TA 
like activities. For example, the Technical Subcommittee of 
the New Nuclear Policy-planning Committee of AEC 
committee considered four options for the handling of spent 
fuels with regard to the future development of nuclear fuel 
cycles in 2004: (1) Reprocessing after a certain period of time 
in storage; (2) Used fuels are reprocessed, but those that 
exceed the capacity for reprocessing are directly disposed of; 
(3) Direct disposal; (4) The used fuel is stored in the short 
term, and then one of the options of reprocessing or direct 
disposal is chosen. There were ten assessment criteria: 
ensuring safety, energy security, environmental suitability, 
economics, nuclear non-proliferation, technological feasibility, 
social acceptance, ensuring options, challenges that 
accompany policy changes, and overseas trends. The 
subcommittee concluded that the current path of reprocessing 
cannot be described as economic if the costs that accompany 
policy changes are not considered, but it has accumulated 
social assets, and is beneficial in its aspects of energy security, 
environmental suitability, and securing options. This resulted 
in the renewed confirmation of the reprocessing path. It was 
innovative in that it analyzed multiple policy options using 
multiple standard assessments. But the weighting of multiple 
criteria was not clear and transparent.  
In addition, general research organizations not limited to 
the energy policy also undertake TA activities related to 
nuclear energy. Activities of NIRA (National Institute for 
Research Advancement), a government wide think tank, in 
late 1970’s is interesting because of the wideness of issues 
dealt with. The research took the stance of promoting the 
development of nuclear power, but there was regret about the 
past in which nuclear development plans were drawn up 
based on optimistic assumptions. “Based on deep regret about 
the past and a strict understanding of the reality of the current 
situation, it is necessary to clarify the various factors affecting 
nuclear power and the various obstructive factors, and 
implement the necessary policies effectively based on 
appropriate predictions of the future” [14]. In April 1974 the 
Atomic Energy Society of Japan (AESJ) established the 
Nuclear Power Systems Investigation Special Research 
Committee. In parallel with this, in April 1975, the Nuclear 
Power Systems Research Committee was established within 
the NIRA. In fact the two committees were held 
simultaneously. The Nuclear Power Systems Research 
Committee was composed of experts from universities, public 
and private research institutions, corporations, industry, and 
government organizations. It created a report 
entitled ”Analyses and Assessments of Nuclear Power 
Systems“ with an a chapter about the light-water reactor and 
reprocessing issues, which were important challenges for the 
consolidation of nuclear power in Japan. It discusses not only 
technological aspects but also a wide range of other aspects 
including nuclear power development, natural restrictions of 
reprocessing and waste disposal, environment and safety, and 
social acceptance.  
  The Nuclear Power Long-Term Strategies Committee, 
with key figures from MITI, was established in April 1977 as 
a continuation of the Nuclear Power Systems Research 
Committee. It conducted in-depth studies of the various 
problems of nuclear power development and use, and 
proposed policies for the future from a long-term perspective 
[15]. This exercise is interesting in that wider social aspects 
were included in the assessment and the result were used 
strategically by MITI to reorient policy concerning light water 
reactor and reprocessing.  
 
E. International Technology Strategy by the Diet Members  
When a STA official lobbied the Diet members for the 
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establishment of parliamentary TA organization in 1970’s, 
they did not have interests in TA activities. But the situation 
had changed in the late 1980’s. In 1987, a friction between 
Japan and the United States took place concerning the 
revision of the “Agreement between the Japan and the US on 
Co-operation in Research and Development in Science and 
Technology”. As Japanese key actors became seriously aware 
of the importance of national strategies in science and 
technology, the necessity of TA came to the fore. The Diet 
members and several key stakeholders including Jiro Kondo 
(SCJ) and Moriya Uchida (Teijin Ltd.), set up the Study 
Group on International Technology Strategy in November 
1988.  
  Parliamentary interests in strategic implication in science 
and technology continued. In June 1994, Taro Nakayama and 
Tatsuro Matsumae set up the Science and Technology and 
Policy Association involving around 150 bipartisan Diet 
members. The association attempted to submit a bill for the 
establishment of a parliamentary TA organization in 1995 and 
1997. After several meetings, the association finally dissolved 
in 2002 without the legislation of a parliamentary TA [1].  
  Bipartisan group played very important role for the 
establishment of Science and Technology Basic Law in 1995. 
But the importance of parliamentary TA seemed to be weaker 
compared to the importance of Science and Technology Basic 
Law in the bargain between politicians and bureaucrats. 
IV. DISCUSSION  
In this final chapter, we would like to analyze the nature 
and problems of TA and TA like activities in Japan, then, draw 
lessons for the future design of institutionalization of TA in 
Japan.  
  First, there are varieties of TA like activities in Japan. 
But except the case of NIRA on nuclear energy, the 
perspectives of those activities were limited. For example, 
risk analysis of food can not deal with cultural issue, medical 
assessment relating to medical reimbursement focuses on 
economic aspects, and energy assessment can not deal with 
lifestyle issues which are closely connected to the energy 
uses.  
  Even when multiple criteria is used, implementation is 
unclear. In the case of food, even though economic, social, 
ethical, and cultural factors can be considered as OLF, how 
those factors are incorporated is not clear. In the case of health, 
effectiveness, safety, dissemination, maturity, morality and 
social validity are identified as factors in addition to impact 
on medical expenses, there is no explicit debate on evaluating 
these additional factors. In the case of reassessment of nuclear 
fuel cycle by the AEC, ten assessment standards such as 
ensuring safety, energy security, environmental suitability, 
economics, nuclear non-proliferation, technological feasibility, 
social acceptance, ensuring options, challenges that 
accompany policy changes, and overseas trends are identified, 
ambiguous factor such as accumulated social assets was 
emphasized at the final report.  
  In addition, there were interesting attempts at 
non-governmental level such as JATES and IFTEC supported 
by business community. But because of lack of enough basic 
funding, they had to rely on sponsored research which 
decreased their independence concerning framing of work. 
  Second, one of the problems of TA activities in Japan is 
the limited effectiveness. Except the Hokkaido GM consensus 
conference, the result of TA was not feed back to the policy 
process. In the case of TA of solar energy by MITI, even 
though the issues of related energy saving measures such as 
insulation of houses and need for paying attention to the 
demand side of technology were identified by the TA, those 
concerns were not feed backed. One of the reasons for 
ineffective feedback is that channels of feedback are narrowly 
conceived. More boarder ways of communicating the TA 
results for purposes such as issues identification and agenda 
setting should be pursuit.  
  Third, the role of Diet has been limited. Compared to the 
end of 1970’s, Diet member became active on national 
strategy since the late 1980’s, but the idea of parliamentary 
TA was never materialized. But bipartisan group played 
important role for establishment of Science and Technology 
Basic Law in 1995s and the legislation of Ocean Basic Law 
and Space Basic Law recently which incorporated science and 
technology strategy in each area.  
  Then based on those experiences, what lessons can we 
learn for the institutionalization of TA in Japan? 
  First, there is a need for flexible framing. It is difficult to 
operate comprehensive framing of technology thinking about 
the costs. But thinking about relatively fixed framing of 
existing TA like activities, function of flexible framing need 
to be embedded somewhere in government or society. But on 
the other hand, all the TA activities need not to be necessarily 
undertaken by new organization. There have to be 
complementarity and collaboration among organizations in 
charge of TA and TA like activities including focused 
activities such as HTA.  
Among various possible components, non-governmental 
initiatives might be interesting to broaden the scope of 
perspectives. But thinking about the history of IFTEC, it is 
necessary to have stable public funding to support these 
activities.  
  Second, there is a need for feedback of the result of TA 
activities including feedback for agenda setting and inter 
organizational networking/ communication as instruments for 
that. But on the other hand, we need to think about 
“appropriate distance.” If the distance is close, there is high 
possibility for feedback. On the other hand, there is a danger 
of constraints on flexible framing. The consensus conference 
by STAFF was the case where official link to decision was 
limited to R&D decisions responding to citizen’s need to keep 
flexibility of discussion. The NIRA program on nuclear 
energy was the case where ad hoc mechanism (outside the 
traditional energy policy community) was used to keep 
flexibility.  
  Third, there might be need for some role for 
parliamentary TA. The function of flexible framing dose not 
have to be undertaken by the Diet. It can be done by 
“independent” organization if it has enough social trust and 
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capability. On the other hand, thinking about the recent trend 
in politics which emphasize the increasing role of politics 
against administration, changing reality of politics in Japan 
(divided government situation and possibility of government 
change) and more objective needs for international 
technology strategy under the present globalization, there is a 
need and possibility of institutionalization of some form of 
parliamentary TA. 
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